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VI. The American Adjudications. The Action not sus-
tained.-We turn now to the American adjudications on the
subject; and here we find a conflict. We shall first review
chronologically the cases in which the English doctrine has been
followed, passing afterwards to those where the action has been
sustained.
The earliest case in which the question was presented to the
courts of this country seems to be Taylor v. Wilson, Coxe 362,
determined in the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the year
1795. The report is very brief, the following being a complete
copy: "Taylor against Wilson. On certiorari. It appeared
from the return in this case, that Taylor, the defendant below,
had been summoned to answer Wilson in a plea of damage;
Wilson's action appeared to have been in part to recover fi'om
Taylor certain costs and expenses which he had incurred in
defending himself in a suit brought against him by Taylor before
Justice TATBM, in which the justice decided there was no cause
of action. PER. CuRIA.-This judgment must be reversed; no
action lies for such expefises, though there can be no doubt Wilson
has been injured." The reporter's syllabus to the case is in these
words : "No action lies to recover the expenses to which a party
has been put by being improperly sued."
VOL. XXX.-45 (353),
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The report of Woodmansie v. Logan, I Penn. (N. J.) 68,
decided in New Jersey in 1806, contains this quaint head note:
"Action lies not for bringing and failing in a suit." The demand
was evidenced by the following bill:
SABIUEL WOODMANSIE,
To ROBERT LOGAN, DR.
For expense going to Monmouth & . $20.00
For my damage on the same'account . 50.00
$70.00
There was a judgment below in favor of the plaintiff for $50
and costs, which was reversed on appeal. "There are sundry
errors in the form of proceeding in this case," said KIRKPATRICK,
0. J., "but I think there is also one which goes to the ground of
the action itself. The second reason assigned for reversal is in
substance, that Woodmansie, as administrator of Penelope Wood-
mansie, had brought an action against Logan for a debt said to be
due to the estate, before a justice at Freehold ; that Woodmansie,
in that action, became nonsuited, and that Logan, for the damiiges
he-had sustained by that prosecution, brought this action and
obtained judgment. And upon inspecting the case filed, this
reason appears to be well founded. The statement is indeed very
vague and uncertain, but if anything can be drawn from it, it is the
train of facts set forth in this reason, and nothing more. There
is contained in it no pretence of Logan's having been held to bail
.oppressively, or of his having been imprisoned, or any other
special grievance. Now it is clearly established in our books, that
for commencing a civil action, though without sufficient cause, no
action on the case for a malicious prosecution will lie. Every
man is entitled to come into a court of justice and claim what he
deems to be his right; if he fails he shall be amerced according to
the old principle for his false claim, and the defendant is entitled
to his costs, and with those he must be content. It was formerly
held, it is true, that if a plaintiff procured the defendant to be held
to excessive bail, or to be imprisoned for want of such bail, by any
false declarations or representations, an action would lie against
him fbr special damages on account of these false representations -
or declarations; but never merely because he prosecuted an action
of law in which he failed. And indeed, now the doctrine of bail
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is more precisely fixed by statute, and in most cases it is put
beyond the power of the plaintiff to oppress in this respect, which
too is eminently the case in justices' courts ; it is much to be
doubted whether actions for malicious prosecutions in civil cases
will lie at all. Be that, however, as it may, no such thing is
pretended here."
In Tkomas v. Rouse, 2 Brev. 75, a South Carolina case, decided
in 1806, BREVARD, J., said: "To bring a civil action, though
there should be no ground for it, is not actionable unless for conse-
quential damages. It is a claim of right, and the plaintiff may
sue at the peril of costs. If it appeared the action was vexatious
and malicious, or with a view to oppress the party, by holding him
to unreasonable bail, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover."
Bay v. Law, 1 Pet. C. C. 207, arose in the federal court in
Pennsylvania, in 1816, and Mr. Justice WASHINGTON said: "This
is an action for what is called a malicious prosecution. The
grounds of the action are a vexatious suit, brought against the
plaintiff maliciously and without probable cause, and holding him
to excessive bail. The law in relation to actions of this nature is
not disputed in this case. Demanding excessive bail, although the
plaintiff has a well-founded cause of action, or holding to bail
when the plaintiff has no cause of action, if done for the purpose
of vexation, entitles the party aggrieved to an action for a malicious
prosecution. If 'bail be not demanded, it is unimportant bow
futile and unfounded the action may be, as the plaintiff is punished
by the payment of costs, 'and the defendant is not materially
injured."
In -Potts v. Imlay, I South. 330, the question came before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey in the year 1816. The facts 'were
these: Potts commenced a suit against Imlay in an inferior court,
on June 10th 1813, the summons being made returniable June 19th.
On that day, at the request of Potts, the cause was adjourned until
July 10th, on which day he did not appear, but suffered a nonsuit.
On July 17th he commenced another action against Imlay, in the
same court and for the same sum as before, the summons being
made returnable July 27th. On that day he obtained a continu-
ance till August 7th, when he discontinued the suit. Thereupon
Imlay brought an action for malicious prosecution, and obtained a
judgment for damages in the sum of $50. The case was then
removed to the Supreme Court by certiorari, the principal reason
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relied on for reversal being that the action was -not maintainable.
Of this opinion were a majority of the court. Said KIRKPATRICK,
0. J.: "There are several reasons assigned for the reversal of this
judgment, but the one principally relied upon, and the only one
of which I shall take notice, Is the fourth, that is to say, because
the state of demand is illegal and insufficient, and contains no law-
ful cause of action. The cause has been twice argued at the bar
upon this reason, the last time at the request of the court, and with
much ability. The books have been searched for four hundred
years back, and upon that search it is conceded, even by the coun-
sel for the plaintiff below himself, that no case can be found in
which this action has been maintained in circumstances similar to
the present. It is True that there are general expressions made
use of by some of the annotators which might seem, at first view,
to embrace the case, as in Hargrave's Notes upon Co. Lit. 161,
and some others; so, also, in some of the reporters. But these
general expressions, by fair rules 'of construction, are to be limited
and compared with the adjudged cases themselves, and not to be
carried beyond them. With such limitation, of which too they
will very fairly admit, they are perfectly consistent with general
principles, but without it they are not law. Formerly the amerce-
ment, now the costs, are the only penalty the law has given against
a plaintiff for prosecuting a suit in a court of justice in the regular
and ordinary way, even though he fail in such prosecution. The
courts of law are open to every citizen, and he may sue, toties
quoties, upon the penalty of lawful costs only. These are consid-
ered as a sufficient compensation for the mere expenses of the
defendant in his defence. They are given to him for this purpose,
and he cannot rise up in a court of justice and say the legislature
have not given him enough. If we were legislators, indeed, per-
haps we should be inclined to say that the costs, in all cases where
costs are given, should completely indemnify the party for all his
necessary expenses, both of time and money; but those to whom
this high trust is iommitted in this state, have thought, and we
will presume, have wis'ely thought, otherwise. In England it is
believed that costs are in some measure discretionary with the
court, and are apportioned to the circumstances of the(6ase; but
here it is not so. They are fixed by statute; they can neither be
increased nor diminished, but, eeteris paribus, are precisely the
same in all cases. :Perhaps a greater latitude given to the courts
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION OF A CIVIL SUIT. 857
of justice ought, in some degree, to alleviate the hardships now
complained of. Besides, if we go to the very equity of the thing,
which seems to be the ground of argument here taken, the same
reasoning which is here used to prove that the defendant ought to
have damages upon a false claim, would also prove that the plain-
tiff ought to have damages upon a false plea. He is put to all the
expense of a trial upon such plea, and yet he can recover nothing
therefor but his lawful costs ; though surely all experience teaches
us that the plea of the defendant is not less frequently false than
the claim of the plaintiff. But to what excesses would this lead
us? Where would litigation end? The truth is that merely for
the expense of a civil suit, however malicious and however ground-,
-less, this action does not lie, nor ever did, so far as I can find, at
any period of our judicial history. It must be attended, besides
ordinary expenses, with other special grievance or damage,
not necessarily incident to a defence, but superadded to it by
the malice and contrivance of the plaintiff; and of these an
arrest seems to be the only one spoken' of in our books. * * *
Upon the whole, upon the strength of these authorities, I think
it may be laid down as law that this action cannot be maintained
for prosecuting a civil suit in a court of common law having com-
petent jurisdiction, by the party himself in interest, unless the
defendant has, upon such prosecution, been arrested without cause
and deprived of his liberty or made to suffer other special griev-
ances different from and superadded to the ordinary expense of a
defence. The case before us is for a suit commenced by summons
where there could be no arrest, nor does the state of demand set
forth any grjevance or damage, other than or different from the
common expenses of making defence in suits of this kind. That
the litigation was protracted as far as the rules of the court would
admit, that it was renewed and ultimately discontinued by the
party does not alter the case. These circumstances are, at most, only
evidence that the prosecution was malicious and without probable
cause; but this 'is not enough. There must be a special grievance,
and that specifically charged in the complaint filed." ROSSELL,
J., dissented, saying: "The reason why but few cases of malicious
prosecution are found in the English reports is, that the costs are
sufficiently great to deter men from bringing suits there merely for
vexation. So, in our courts of more extensive jurisdiction, per-
haps no case can be shown of a person, from malice only, prose-
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cuting a suit, the costs of which would inevitably fall on himself.
But since the jurisdiction of justices' courts has been increased,
many instances have arisen of persons being summoned from their
homes, thirty or more miles, to defend themselves against a
groundless demand, maliciously contrived to harass and perplex
them. Unprincipled men have frequently boasted, on some real
or imaginary injury, that they would be revenged on their antago-
nists by harassing them with feigned demands, before justices
thirty or forty miles distant, as the costs would amount to a few
cents only. If,. then, not a solitary case could be found in any
English reporter, nor even the principle in terms hinted at, I
should not hesitate to say the action was maintainable on prin-
ciples of common sense, common right and common justice." But
the third member of the court concurred with KIRKPATRICK, 0. J.,
and the action was dismissed.
"I agree," said SOUTHARD, J., "in opinion with the chief
justice. The positions laid down by him I believe are law, and I
cannot add to their elucidation. Originally when a false claim
was made and a vexatious suit carried on, the plaintiff was subject
to amercement, but he was not subject to damages in addition.
That was considered sufficient, and it was not the notion of those
days to prevent me n from applying to courts for a redress of their
grievances. After the amercement fell into disuse, the legislature
interfered and gave costs ; but for what purpose? To compen-
sate the party for his ordinary.and regular expenses in his suit,'
but not for any injury out of the usual and common course of pro-
ceeding-in courts of justice. For such it did not pretend to apply
a remedy. The legislature no doubt supposed that it had given
costs enough to effect the purposes which it had in view. It did
not intend that the party should come in, say that the provision
was ,not ample enough, that the costs did not satisfy his expenses,
and therefore claim damages by suit to correct the miscalculation
of the legislature. It was alleged, however, in the argument at
the bar, that in the court for the trial of small causes no costs are
really received by the defendant for his own benefit and to pay his
expenses; and therefore that he must be entitled to sue where he
has been put to cost in that court. The reasoning is fallacious.
In this as in every other court, the legislature have fixed what
costs shall be given. If it was thought best that these costs
should amount only t6, so much as the party was obliged to pay to
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the officers and witnesses, &c., still it is a legislative determination
of the matter, and parties have no right to object to it. Besides
quite as much money does go into the pockets of the parties in
that court as in any other. Parties nowhere put money into their
poqkets by bills of costs ; they never remunerate them for time,
labor or expense; they only amount to the sums lawfully due to
the officers and witnesses. In every suit, no matter how regular
or correct in law and justice, both plaintiff and defendant are com-
pelled to submit to a considerable amount of expenses, which bills
of costs can never reach nor ever were designed to reach. I can-
not believe that the defendant can recover these expenses by suit,
where. he can prove that the plaintiff maliciously sued him. This
would neither be lawful nor expedient. He must be able to show
something -more, as arrest or special grievance. Those cases
which were cited to show that expense alone was sufficient to
maintain the action, do not contradict this position. They are all
criminal cases, or refer to and are founded on them. * * * It is
not unlikely that some of the inconveniences which have been men-
tioned at the bar will result from the'doctrine now established in
the' court for the trial of small causes. Unprincipled men are
often to be found in every society who, for the sole purpose of vex-
ing and harassing a neighbor who they dislike, will bring many
malicious suits; if the only evil they are to suffer is the payment
of costs in that court. But the contrary doctrine would lead to
consequences not less unpleasant; and if this were not so we can-
not here remedy the evil. By enlarging the jurisdiction of
justices and giving almost nominal costs, the legislature have
offered temptations to the malignant to bring vexatious suits.
Higher costs would repress this feeling. It is only in that court
that such suits are heard of. But the law I conceive to be clear.
and if remedy be necessary it must come from a different authority
from this court." See also Allgore v. Stillwell, 6 N. J. (Law)
166 (1822).
The latest case in the courts of this country, in which the topic
of this article was passed upon, is HcfNamee v. llinke, 49 Md.
122, decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 1878. The
declaration stated that the defendant sued out an ejectment-writ
commanding the sheriff to summon the plaintiff to answer the
defendant in an action of ejectment; that in said action the de-
fendant falsely and maliciously claimed of the plaintiff all of the
860 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION OF A CIVIL SUIT.
lot sued for (known as lot 6), when in fact he had no probable
cause of action against the plaintiff for the whole of that lot; that
the trial resulted in a. verdict that the defendant should not take
the whole of said lot, and that the plaintiff bad been put to trouble
and expense in defending said suit for which he claimed damages.
Various questions of pleading were raised by the defendant. The
court after disposing of them said: "But this record is inadmissible
up6n the broader and more substantial ground that, when con-
sidered in connection with the allegations in support of which it is
offered, it fails to show such a prosecution as will maintain the
present action. It is true a party may be held liable for a false
and malicious prosecution of either a criminal or civil proceeding;
but when it has been attempted to hold a party liable for the prose-
cution of a civil proceeding, it has generally been in cases where
there has been an alleged malici6us arrest of the person, as in the
case of Turner v. Walker, 8 Gill & J. 377, or a groundless and
malicious seizure of property, or the false and malicious placing
the plaintiff in bankruptcy, or the like. * * * If the plaintiff
declares that he has been falsely and maliciously arrested, or that
by reason of a false claim maliciously asserted by the defendant
he was required to give bail, and upon failure he was detained in
custody or his property was attached, there the action lies because
of the special damage sustained by the plaintiff. It is not enough,
however, for the plaintiff to declare generally that the defendant
brought an action ex inalitia et sine eausa,per quod he put him to
great charge, &c.; but he must allege and show the grievance
specially. Otherwise parties would be constantly involved in liti-
gation, trying over cases that may have failed, upon the mere
allegation of false and malicious prosecution."
VII. The Ameriean Adjudications. The Action sustained.-
We pass-now to the cases in which the courts of this country have
intimated or expressly ruled that the action is maintainable.
Vanduzor v. Liriderman, 10 Johns. 106, was decided in the
Supreme Court of New York in 1813. The plaintiff sued the
defendant before a justice for the loss of the service of his son
whilst defending a certain suit brought against him by the defend-
ant, and for money paid by the plaintiff in behalf of his son in
and about defending the said suit. There was a trial by jury and
a verdict for the plaintiff for $3, for which the justice gave judg-
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION OF A CIVIL SUIT.
ment. The defendant appealed. PER CURIAm.-" No action lies
merely for bringing a suit against a person without sufficient
ground. To sustain a suit for a former prosecution it must appear
to have been without cause and malicious, and ah action for mali-
cious prosecution is not cognizable before a justice. Judgment
reversed." It will be observed that though the language of the
court is broad enough to include an ordinary civil action, yet the
case itself went off on a question of jurisdiction, and.the expres
sions of the court are therefore obiter.
Panburm v. Bull, I Wend. 345, which arose in New York in
1828, is the next case. The declaration alleged that P. not having
any reasonable or probable cause of action against B., as he well
knew, sued him before a justice of the peace in an action of tres-
pass in the case; that B. appearing, P. after one adjournment dis-
continued the case, but immediately thereafter commenced another
suit on the same claim, in which after a trial judgment was rendered
against P. for the costs of the suit, whereby he was greatly damni-
fled, &c. It was argued that there having been no arrest or holding
to bail the action would not lie. But the Supreme Court thought
differently, and affirmed the plaintiff's judgment for $7.25, WooD-
WARD, J., saying: " From an examination of the cases it appears
that an arrest and holding to bail are not indispensably necessary
in order to maintain an action for a malicious prosecution. It has
been sustained in cases where there was neither an arrest or bail;
and when it is considered that malice and the want of probable
cause are the foundation of the action, it would seem on principle
to reach cases where the injury would be equally great, although
the proceeding did not require an arrest or bail." But all the
cases cited by the judge were cases of "arrest or bail."
In Wldpple v. Puller, 11 Conn. 582, decided in Connecticut in
1836, the plaintiff's property had been attached in an ungrounded
and malicious suit for slander, in which the defendant had been
nonsuited, and he sued to recover damages. "The defendant,"
said CHURcH, J., "claims that no action will lie at common law
to recover damages sustained in consequence of being maliciously
sued and prosecuted in an unfounded civil action, unless the body
of the defendant in such action -as arrested or holden to bail ;
neither of which was done in the vexatious suit complained of.
This objection requires consideration. It certainly has received
plausibility, if not direct countenance, from the remarks of some
VOL XXX.-46
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learned commentators, as well as from the decisions of courts.
* * * It seems to be conceded that when anything is done
maliciously, besides merely commencing and prosecuting a mali-
cious or vexatious action, a suit for damages sustained by such
act may be maintained. And therefore it is that an action
is sustainable for a malicious arrest or a holding to bail for
too large a sum, and for maliciously suing out and levying
a writ of fieri facias. Upon the same principle an action
may be maintained where the property of a party has been
maliciously attached upon mesne process, under all jurisdic-
tions where such attachments are known. But we wish to place
our decision of this question upon broader principles; principles
which we.believe have received the sanction of the common law in
its earliest ages. Before the statute which was passed in the fifty-
second years of Henry III., no costs were recoverable in civil
actions. This statute, and others subsequently enacted, gave costs
to successful defendants, as it is said, by way of damages against
the plaintiff pro falso elamore. Whatever might have been true
when the several statutes giving costs were enacted, we cannot at
this day shut our eyes to the truth known by everybody that tax-
able costs 'afford a very partial and inadequate remuneration for
the necessary expenses of defending an unfounded suit; and of
course this remedy is not adequate to repair the injury thus
received; and the common law declares that for every injury
there is a 'remedy. lBefore the statutes entitling defendants to
costs existed, they had a remedy at common law for injuries sus-
tained by reason of suits which were malicious and -without prob-
able cause. And this principle is and ought to be operative still
in all cases where the taxation of costs is not an ample remedy.
It is upon this principle, in part at least, that actions have ever
been sustained for malicious criminal prosecutions, in which no
costs are taxed in favor of the accused."
Cox v. Taylor, 10 B. Mon. 17, was determined in Kentucky in
1849. The action was for maliciously suing out and keeping up
an injunction whereby the plaintiff was restrained from the use of
his land for several years; but in rendering the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, MARSHALL, C. J., said: "The action is
essentially for a malicious prosecution, that is for the groundless
institution and prosecution of a suit without probable cause. The
common law did not give this action merely on the ground that
the former plaintiff may have been unable to establish a claim
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asserted by suit, although the decision of that suit might con-
clusively determine the injustice and wrongfulness of his claim.
It allowed every man to pursue his claims by the established
remedies, subject to no other burthens or penalties but such as
were incident to the remedies themselves in case of failure, unless
he had resorted to them not only without such actual grounds as
would insure success, but without even probable cause or ground
for the proceeding, and therefore presumably for the mere purpose
of harassing or injuring the other party, either in respect to his
life, liberty, property or reputation. And the principle is the
same whether the malicious proceeding be a criminal prosecution
or a civil suit. In either case the wrong consists not merely in
the falsity and consequent injustice of the charge or claim, but in
its being made by legal proceedings without probable cause, and
therefore as the law decides from malicious motives alone."
In Closson v. &taples, 42 Vt. 209, decided by the Supreme
Court of Vermont in 1869, it appeared that C. had signed a
promissory note as surety fbr one K., payable to S. or bearer. K.
paid the note at maturity, but S. failed to deliver it up, alleging
that he had lost it, and K. afterwards enlisted in the army and
died in another state leaving no property. S., after the decease of
K., produced the note, claiming that it had not been paid, demanded
payment of C., and threatened trouble if the matter was not settled.
Subsequently S. procured one B. to commence a suit against C. on
it, in which case judgment was finally rendered against B. on the
merits. C. then brought an action against S. on these facts, alleg-
oing that he could not recover any of his taxable costs against B.
as he was worthless, and that he had been put to "great trouble,
annoyance and expense, in looking up witnesses, preparing his
defence to said* suit, and employment of counsel and attending
said court, and other large expenses of time and money and teams."
In the Supreme Court it was held that he was entitled to recover,
WILSON, J., delivered an exhaustive opinion: "This is an action
on the case for malicious prosecution of a civil suit," said the
learned judge, "and the first question is whether the court erred
in their refusal to charge the jury as requested by the defendant.
The case states that the plaintiff introduced testimony tending to
prove all the allegations of his -declaration, and the necessary facts
to entitle him to recover, except it was not proved that the plain-
tiff in this suit was arrested, or any property attached on the writ
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in the suit mentioned in the declaration which S. caused to be
prosecuted, but it was served on C. only by the officer delivering
him a copy. The defendant requested the court to charge the
jury that the action could not be maintained without proof that
C. was arrested or his property attached in that original suit.
This leads us to consider whether an action for malicious prosecu-
tion of a civil suit without reasonable or probable cause will lie
where the process in the suit so maliciously prosecuted is by sum-
mons only.. In England before the statute of Marlbridge no costs
were recoverable in civil actions. It seems that before the statutes
entitling the defendant in civil actions to costs, if the suit termi-
nated in his favor, he might support an action at common law
against the plaintiff if the proceeding was malicious and without
probable cause. But in England, since the statutes which give
costs to the defendant in all actions in case of a nonsuit or verdict
against the plaintiff and in other stages of the cause, it seems that
no action can be maintained merely in respect of a civil suit
maliciously instituted, except in some cases under legislative pro-
visions, and perhaps excepting cases where the defendant failed to
obtain the ordinary costs owing to the insolvency of a third pirty
in whose name the suit was prosecuted. It is said that those
statutes give costs to successful defendants by way of damages
against the plaintiff "pro falso clamore. * * * Th'ere does not
appear to be any conflict in the authorities that where anything is
done maliciously, besides commencing and prosecuting a malicious
or vexatious action, a suit for the damages sustained by such act
may be maintained. * * * It is said in some of the cases that
where the process in the malicious and unfounded suit is by attach-
ment, an action will lie for the damage the party sustains, because
in such case no cost is allowed which can be a compensation for
the personal injury. But we think the fundamental principles
and analogies of the common law, as laid down by the text writers
and early decisions of the English courts, do not make the manner
in which the service of the process was made essential to maintain
the action. The common law declares that for every injury there
is a remedy. * * * The early English cases show very clearly
that before the statute entitling defendants to costs they had a
remedy at common law for injuries sustained by reason of suits
which were malicious and without probable cause. It would seem,
however, from more recent decisions that the present English rule,
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which restricts or limits the right of action for maliciously prose-
cuting civil suits without probable cause, stands mainly upon the
ground that the costs which the statute provides the successful
defendant shall recover are an adequate compensation for the
damages he sustains, but under their rule it does not appear that
the right of action is restricted to those cases where the process is
by attachment. The justice or equity of the English rule, as a
part of their system of jurisprudence, there is no occasion to con-
sider. But in our own state not only the mode of process in civil
actions, but also the general provisions of our statute for taxing
costs to the defendant, when the suit terminates in his favor, are
opposed to making it essential to sustain an action for the malicious
prosecution of a civil suit without probable cause, that his body
was arrested or his property attached. * * * Our statute by which
the prevailing party recovers certain costs incurred in the prosecu-
tion or defence of a civil action, stands upon the ground that certain
claims and rights, in respect to the matters in issue, are asserted
that in the adjudication of which a civil action, when brought and
prosecuted in good faith, is a claim of right; and in order to .place
the administration of the law upon reasonable grounds, in respect
to the rights asserted and recoverable costs, the expenses of litiga-
ting the claims of the parties, over and above certain items of
costs, which the statute allows the prevailing party to recover,
should be borne by the respective parties by whom such expenses
are incurred without regard to the result of the suit. But the sys-
tem of taxing costs under our statute, except in a very few cases,
was enacted with reference to suits brought and prosecuted in good
faith. In suits so brought and prosecuted the defendant may be
subjected, or he may subject himself, to expenses not recoverable,
even if the suit terminates in his favor; but of this he has no legal
ground to complain when the suit is brought and prosecuted in
good faith, because it is the ordinary and natural consequence of
a uniform and well-regulated system to which all parties in civil
actions are required to conform. But where the action is brought
and prosecuted maliciously, and without reasonable or probable
cause, the plaintiff asserts no claim in respect to which he had any
right to involke the aid of the law. In such cases the plaintiff,
by an abuse of legal process, unjustly subjects the defendant to
damages which are not fully compensated by the costs he recovers.
The plaintiff in such case has no legal or equitable right to claim
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that the rule of law which allows a suit to be brought and- prose-
cuted in good faith without liability of the plaintiff to pay the
defendant damages, except by way and to the extent of the taxable
costs only, if judgment be rendered in his favor, should extend to
a case where the suit was maliciously prosecuted without probable
cause. But where the damages sustained by the defendant in
-defending a suit maliciously prosecuted without reasonable or
probable cause, exceed the costs obtained by him, he has and of
right should have a remedy by action on the case."
In 11farbourg v. Smith, 11 Kans. 554, decided by the Supreme
Court of Kansas, in 1.873, M. & L., as partners, had sued S. for
slander, the case being dismissed at M. & L.'s costs. S. there-
upon brought an action for malicious prosecution, and recovered
judgment for $75, which was affirmed on appeal. "The only
question of law arising upon the last assignment of error," said
VALENTINE, J., "is whether an action for malicious prosecution
can be maintained in a case like the one at bar, where neither the
person nor property was seized, nor bail nor security required, and
the ordinary costs of defending the alleged malicious prosecution
have been allowed. Our opinion upon this case has already been
foreshadowed. We suppose that an action for malicious prosecu-
tion can be maintained in any case where a malicious prosecution,
without probable cause, has, in fact been had and terminated, and
the defendant in such prosecution has sustained damage over and
above his taxable costs in the case, (citing Whipple v. Fuller, 11
Conn. 582; Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209; Pangburn v. Bull,
1 Wend. 845). At common law the defendant in such a case
always had a remedy. Originally it was an action for malicious
prosecution; subsequently it was amercement of the plaintiff, pro
falso clamore. But now and in this state an amercement is abol-
ished; the defendant must return to his original remedy of
malicious prosecution. It is an old maxim that there can be no
legal right without a remedy, and the legal right in such a case
has always been recognised."
In Woods v. Pinnell, 13 Bush 629 (1878), 17 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 689, decided in Kentucky, in January 1878, the declaration
alleged that the plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of the
county of Mercer, Ky. ; that the defendant, for the purpose of
annoying the plaintiff and. subjecting him to unnecessary expense
and trouble, falsely pretended to change his residence to the state
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of Indiana, and that he actually went to that state, not for the
purpose of residing there in good faith, but to enable him to insti-
tute a suit in the Utlited States Circuit Court for the district of
Kentucky, for an assault alleged to have been committed by the
plaintiff on the defendant; that claiming his residence in Indiana,
he falsely and maliciously, and without reasonable cause, instituted
a suit against the plaintiff for the said assault; that a trial was
had and judgment rendered against the defendant, and that the
plaintiff was thereby put to great expense defending the suit, for
which he claimed damages. A demurrer was sustained in the
court below, but on appeal .the judgment was reversed. Said
PnioR, J., "The action instituted in the United States Circuit
Court being a civil action, the sole question in these cases is, can
an action for malicious prosecution, or rather an action on the case,
be maintained for the institution and prosecution, without probable
cause, of a malicious and vexatious suit. The elementary books,
in treating of the action for malicious prosecution, lay down the
rule that there are three descriptions of damages, either of which
is sufficient to support that action, and some one of them must
appear or the action will fail: 1. To the person, by imprisonment;
2. To the reputation, by scandal; 3. To the property, by expense.
(3 Cooley's Blackstone, and notes, 126; 2 Selwyn's Nisi Prius
252.) This rule was evidently established after the enactment of the
Statute of Marlbridge, giving to the defendant his costs in the
event the plaintiff was nonsuited or failed to recover ; for at com-
mon law, prior to that enactment, such actions could be maintained
whether the property of the defendant was seized or not, or
whether he had incurred expense in defending it; and regarding,
then as now, the bringing of a civil action to be a matter of right,
the plaintiff was liable in damages for the malicious institution and
prosecution of such an action without probable cause. After the
statute giving costs to the defendant, it was held by the common-
law courts that no action could be maintained on account of the
institution and prosecution of a civil action without probable cause,
and therefore no action could lie for a vexatious ejectment. In all
such cases the plaintiff must have gone beyond the proper remedy
for the enforcement of his claim, such as procuring an illegal order
of arrest or requiring excessive bail, before the action could be
maintained. This entire doctrine is based on the idea that the
plaintiff bringing the action is sufficiently punished, and the
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defendant fully recompensed by the statute requiring the plaintiff,
to pay all the costs. We perceive no good reason for following this
rule, and denying to the defendant a remedy when his damages ex-
ceed the ordinary costs of the action. The fact that a .plaintiff
has been subjected to the payment of costs pro falso clamore, is
no recompense to the defendant when the latter has, by reason
of the malicious proceeding on the part of the plaintiff, sustained
damage. In cases where the plaintiff has mistaken his action, or
been nonsuited, or where, by reason of some imaginary claim, he
has seen proper to sue the defendant, it is not pretended that any
action for damages can be maintained; but where the claim is not
only false, but the action is.prompted alone by malice and without
any probable cause, the defendant's right of recovery for the
expenses incurred and damages sustained, should be as fully recog-
nised as if his property had been attached or his body taken charge
of by the sheriff. While the damages may be less in the one case
than the other, the legal right exists and some remedy should be
afforded. If the facts alleged in these petitions are true, and
they must be so treated on demurrer, it would be a singular system
of jurisprudence that would admit the wrong and still withhold the
remedy. Following the doctrine of the common law, that for
every injury there is a remedy, we see no reason for denying a
remedy to the plaintiffs in each of these cases; and where a party
seeks a judicial tribunal for the purpose alone of gratifying his
malice, he should be made to recompense the party injured for the
damages actually sustained, and the courts should see that a remedy
is afforded foi that purpose."
VIII. Conclusion.-We have now reviewed all the American
cases, pro and con; and the weight of authority appears to be
against the right of action for the unfounded and malicious prose-
cution of an ordinary civil action. With the majority are all but
one of the text-writers we have cited-Swift, Townsend, Addison,
and the editors of the American leading cases who follow the
English adjudications: Mr. Weeks, who limits the right to "ex-
tremely vexatious suits where special damage has been actually
suffered," and Judge CooLEY, who discourages the remedy without
positively denying the right. On the other side is Mr. Hilliard,
who evidently favors the action, but unfortunately relies upon
cases which do not sustain it at all. Of the thirteen cases we
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have just examined, three: Taylor v. Wilson, in New Jersey;
Thomas v. Rouse, in South Carolina, and lcamee v. .inke,
in Maryland-hold that the action is not sustainable because it is
not; three- Woodmansie v. Logan and Potts v. Imlay, in New
Jersey, and Bay v. Law, in the federal court, that it will not lie
because the defendant has his costs, which, in England, is con-
sidered a sufficient remedy. In the New York case of TVanduzor
v. Linderman, the opinion of the court is obiter, and at the same
time far-from clear, and in the Kentucky case of Coxe v. Taylor,
the defendant complained of the malicious issuing of an injunction
which had caused him special damage. In but five cases: Pang-
burA v. Bull, in New.York; Whipple v. Smith, in Connecticut;
Closson v. Staples, in Vermont; Marburg v. Smith, in Kansas,
and Woods v. JFinnell, in Kentucky, do the courts recognise that
here there is a wrong for which there should be a remedy. But
while the weight of authority denies the action, the weight of
reason allows it. We have set out at length the argument of the
courts pro and con, and no one can read them without being struck
with the weakness of the position assumed by the majority of the
American courts that have been called upon to deal with this ques-
tion, and of the Writers who have stated the law as they understood
the decisions. Take away the reason upon which the English
cases stand, viz., that the defendant's damages are assessed to him
by his judgment for costs, and what remains to stand in the way
of a remedy by action? Nothing at all. The English cases
admit the wrong; they do not deny that for any substantial and
special damage outside the costs of the defence, the defendant may
recover in this form. Therefore, if his goods have beeh attached,
or his person has been imprisoned, they allow a recovery; but
where nothing of this kind has occurred they say to the debtor,
" The law does not fail to recognise that you should be recom-
pensed for the damages you have suffered in resisting a malicious
and unfounded suit, and that your persecutor should be made to
reimburse you. If you have been damaged beyond the ordinary'
costs of a lawsuit, this is the tribunal to which you may appeal.
But if you have been damaged to that extent and ho more, you
can not come here, for Parliament has declared that these costs-
shall be assessed to you at the time you obtain your verdict, and
in the form of a judgment against the plaintiff in the same suit"
But there are few, if any, American courts that can address the
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suitor in these terms. In England the allowance of costs is in the
majority of cases, and as effectually as can be accomplished under
a general rule, a complete satisfaction to a successful defendant.
The costs taxed to him include his attorney's charges for pre-
paring the case for trial in all its parts, the fees of the witnesses
and the court officials, and even the honorarium of the barris.ter
who conducted the case in court. The American' system, as car-
ried on in most of the states, gives to the defendant little or
nothing beyond the costs of the suit. The English decisions have,
therefore, no applicability here, and can only be followed by our
courts to a ridiculous result. Two further arguments against the
action remain, neither of which can stand an examination. "It is
said that, if such suits are generally allowed, litigation will become
interminable, for every unsuccessful action will be followed by
another, alleging malice in the prosecution of.the former, and, sec-
ondly, that if the defendant may sue for damages sustained by an
unfounded prosecution, the plaintiff may equally bring an action
when the defendant makes 'a groundless defence: Waterer v.
Freeman, Hobart 205 (16410);" Potts v. Imlay/, supra. In answer
to the first objection it is enough to say that the action will never
lie for an unsuccessful prosecution unless begun and carried on
with malice and without reasonable cause. With the burden of
this difficult proof upon him, the litigant will need a very clear
case before he will be willing to begin a suit of this character.
The second argument fails to distinguish between the position of
the parties, plaintiff and defendant, in an action at law. The
plaintiff sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly and
maliciously, he is the cause of the defendant's damage. But the
defendant stands only on his legal rights-the plaintiff having
taken his case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling
upon him to prove it to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, and
he is gnilty of no wrong in exercising this privilege.
JOHN D. LAWSON.
St. Louis.
